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When HU Bo posted his tweet in July 2014, he must have immediately felt that he had
made a big mistake. Just three hours after he wrote in his intra-workspace social media
group about the ongoing riots in China’s far western region of Yarkand County, he took his
post down and shortly after surrendered to the police in his hometown of Ürümqi. He was in
trouble because he had not only repeated the official news, but he apparently had added
some unconfirmed rumors about the intensity and extent of the riots. This had put him
outside of the law.
Fake news is illegal in China. Or, to be more precise, spreading rumors and especially
spreading rumors or “fabricated information” on terrorism is a crime in China. What started
out as an attempt to curb libelous vitriol on the internet quickly became a powerful means of
the Chinese criminal justice system for controlling social media news and is now a core
feature of the Chinese Counterterrorism Law of 2015 (Articles 19, 90) and, since its ninth
amendment in 2015, of the Chinese Criminal Law (Article 291b). As early as 2013 the
Supreme People’s Court (SPC) had published three “model cases” for the adjudication of
spreading false terrorist information, which are meant as a form of non-binding orientation
for lower courts.
Essentially, these cases are building on a.) the knowledge that the disseminated
information was false such as invented bomb threats and b.) that the dissemination of the
information caused serious disruption of the social order such as the evacuation of a
student’s cafeteria or serious delays at an airport after emergency procedures were
enacted. The criminal law until 2015 would warrant a fixed term of imprisonment of up to
five years for such conduct, hence the three model cases saw sentences between fifteen
months and four years, depending mainly on the seriousness of the disruption of social
order and on the underlying motive for disseminating the false information. The four-years-
sentenced, e.g., was pronounced for the airport bomb threat, which was aimed at
preventing a debt collector from boarding his scheduled flight to the debtor. Since the
tightening of the Criminal Law in 2015, disseminating false information became a stand-
alone provision whit a varying sentencing standard for false terrorist information (up to five
years imprisonment and at least five years if the disruption of the social order had serious
consequences) and other false information about sensitive issues like health hazards or
natural catastrophes (up to three years and between three and seven years, respectively).
Before this amendment, HU Bo eventually found himself sentenced to six months
imprisonment. The court argued that his tweet had incited ethnic hatred and discrimination,
which was considered his form of severely disrupting the social order, even though his
lawyer asserted that his client did not even hint at the ethnicity of the rioters in Yarkand. His
sentence was already a mitigated punishment as he was a first time offender, showed real
remorse and even followed the social convention of voluntarily surrendering after his crime.
Nevertheless, HU Bo had found himself in the midst of China’s People’s War on Terror,
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which is a criminal justice campaign that is fashioned along the lines of the so-called strike
hard campaigns of the Deng Xiaoping era and requires the authorities to exercise their
duties of criminal prosecution with utmost swiftness and render the harshest possible
judgments, which the court in HU Bo’s case arguably did.
Among the many constitutional issues that can be raised within China’s People’s War on
Terror, the freedom of speech may not necessarily head the list of possible human rights
violations. It nevertheless provides an instructive example for China’s approach to the
protection of fundamental rights in times of terrorism. Unlike issues as arbitrary detentions
of persons who exhibit a conduct that falls within the broad definition of terrorist or extremist
behavior in China or the excessive use of the death penalty for a wide array of terrorist
activities, freedom of speech is less directly associated with immediate terrorist threats.
And, China’s constitution is guaranteeing the freedom of speech in Article 35 so that
security concerns about the extent of this fundamental right might be mitigated by this
constitutional provision.
However, China has no constitutional court and no efficacious constitutional review
mechanism. The de jure almighty National People’s Congress could exercise its right to
interpret the constitution, but its de facto wire-puller, the Chinese Communist Party,
appears not to be interested in rousing a constitutional review for the time being. HU Bo
was therefore not in the position to seek judicial redress from a constitutional violation.
Even though his right to the freedom of speech may be impaired, he has no legal recourse
for constitutional matters in China.
There had been a brief moment of time in which it appeared as if China’s SPC would have
produced its very own Marbury vs. Madison. This is at least what a Vice-President of the
court in 2001 heralded as the dawn of a new era for constitutional jurisprudence in China,
after his chamber had directly applied the constitution in a rather simple tort case of identity
theft. It was however reported that internal regulations banned the Chinese judiciary from
following this example and prohibited a direct application of the constitution even before
this case was officially repealed in 2008.The door was shut on China’s judicialization of its
constitution (宪法司法化).
Nevertheless, Chinese courts are still using the constitution and are e.g. applying the
constitutional right to work in (once again) tort cases that hinge on the question whether
persons who have reached the retirement age but still hold down a job can be awarded
compensation for the loss of income after they were injured and impaired in a traffic
accident. Following the reasoning that the constitution is granting the right to work without
any time limits, Chinese courts frequently ordered the insurance companies to pay such
compensations. The constitutional right to the freedom of speech is also used in Chinese
courts. For example, a court in Hubei decided that a company could not fire one of its
employees just because she made public derogatory statements about said company. The
judges even declared a corresponding provision in the company’s internal disciplinary
regulations as unlawful on the grounds that such a provision would limit the employees’
right to the freedom of speech. But limiting the power of companies in civil cases and
limiting the power of the Chinese state in administrative or criminal cases are two different
pairs of shoes and courts apparently know their place in China’s authoritarian system. They
are not necessarily in the business of judicial checks and balances, even though the 2015
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revamped Administrative Procedure Law may be considered a modest impetus for such a
development.
The Chinese citizenry is however frequently less timid and obedient when it comes to
confronting the government and administrative penalties for actions that are closely linked
with the freedom of speech are frequently challenged in court. Nevertheless, administrative
detention, pronounced by the police, for inciting or staging protest against state organs or
the traditional form of remonstration, that is petitioning the administration after enduring
injustice by a state organ, if it is exercised on Tiananmen-Square or close to the adjacent
government quarters of Zhongnanhai, are generally upheld by Chinese courts. Many courts
acknowledge that the constitution guarantees the freedom of speech or even the right to
protest or petition (Art. 41), but these fundamental rights are limited by the public order and
have to be balanced against the fundamental duty laid down in article 51 of the constitution
which stipulates that “citizens of the People’s Republic of China, in exercising their
freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the State, of society or of the
collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens”.
This constitutional catch-all provision is certainly the last line of defense against the liberal
idea of limitations on state power in China. Even when the Chinese courts engaged in their
form of low-key constitutional jurisprudence, which they are not supposed to do, they
exhibit enough self-restrain not to question the state’s power and limit its coercive
measures. As was just recently reaffirmed by the latest constitutional amendment in March
2018, the Chinese constitution is not about granting protection from the state or
safeguarding fundamental rights and liberties, it is about securing the political power of the
regime or in the words of the new Article 1 (2): “The socialist system is the basic system of
the People’s Republic of China. The leadership by the Chinese Communist Party is the
most essential feature of the socialist system of Chinese characteristics. Disruption of the
socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited.”
Hence, challenging measures that are enacted in the name of stability and security in
China, as is its counterterrorism framework, on constitutional grounds is a futile endeavor. 
Even in cases that are not directly related to imminent security threats, the Chinese
criminal justice system will bow to the overwhelming imperative of contributing to the now
apparently perpetuated People’s War on Terror by harsh and swift conviction, just as in the
case of HU Bo who spent six months in a prison for an ill conceived tweet to his
colleagues.
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